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TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 
by Robert S. Tragesser 
Phenomenology is concerned with the analysis of the contents of conscious- 
ness and with the philosophic consequences of respecting, and of failing to 
respect, the integrity of the sense of those contents. (If metaphysics is con- 
cerned with the study of "entity qua entity," phenomenology is concerned with 
"appearing entity qua appearing entity.") The purpose of this paper is to give 
the reader a feeling for the subject and for its philosophic consequences, as well 
as to present the beginnings of a phenomenology of perception. 
The princ~pal significance that I see in attending carefully to the contents 
of our mind (to '*phenomenaw) is this: our scientific theories contain elements 
whose presence is justified by sound, careful argument, and elements which are 
arbitrary, instituted on the basis of conventions, more or less fixed by fiat. Our 
theories are improved when we can supplant conventions by reasons (e.g., 
when we can replace hypotheses with proved or demonstrated propositions). 
The more we can replace arbitrary elements by fully reasoned elements, the 
sounder our theories will be. 
The problem faced by anyone seeking to maximize his rational control over 
his theory by replacing convention by reason is that of Jindirrg compelling 
corrsiderations making a difference. Phenomenology is interesting because the 
close analysis of the contents of one's mind or thought often yields such 
compelling considerations. The solution to deep intellectual problems of all 
varieties often depends upon a deeper analysis of such contents than anyone 
has previously given (e.g,, Einstein's analysis of simultaneity, Brouwer's analy- 
sis of dimension). 
In the following I present a phenomenological analysis of the contents of 
visual perception. 
In his Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis Husserl made the following interest- 
ing remark: "die aussere Wahrnehmung ist eine bestandige Pratention, etwas 
zu leisten, was sie ihrem eigenen Wesen nach zu leisten ausserstande ist. Also 
gewissermassen ein Widerspruch gehort zu ihrem Wesen."' And then: 
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Jeder Aspekt, jede noch so welt fortgefiuhrte Kontlnuttat von elnzelnen Abschattungen g ~ b t  
nur Se~ ten ,  und das ]st, wle wlr uns uberzeugen, keln blosses Faktum Elne aussere Wahrneh- 
mung 1st undenkbar, die ~ h r  Wahrgenommenes In ~ h r e m  s~nnendtngltchen Gehalt er- 
schopfte, etn Wahrnehmungsgegenstand 1st undenhbar, der  tn etner abgeschlossenen 
Wahrnehmung tm strengsten Slnn allselttg, nach der  A l lhe~ t  ~ e l n e r  slnnltch anschaul~chen 
Merkmale gegeben seln konnte ' 
Visual perception by its very nature over-extends itself. It "finds" its object 
to be something which it can view in part, but never completely. We see 
"transcendent" objects, and having the character of being a seeing of some- 
thing transcendent is an intrinsic characteristic of visual perception. Perhaps 
it is an oblique recognition of the seeming impossibility of removing such a 
characteristic from visuaI perception that gives G. E. Moore's so-called "proof 
of the existence of the world" whatever force it might have. In any case, this 
characteristic of visual perception emerges quite soon in a phenomenological 
analysis of visual perception. 
I find myself in a world which lies about me in every direction without visible 
discontinuity. A vast and complex array of things is displayed before me, an 
array that is only a very small part of the world. The things scattered about 
me are viewed from a perspective determined by my position and the direction 
of my glance. The things persist when I dose  my eyes. Although I can no 
longer see the things about me, I continue to be aware of being in their 
presence, for I am aware of my body and of the space about it, the space 
continuing outwards, encompassing and containing the things that I was 
looking at a moment ago. 
Open your eyes now I wtll One  moment Has  all van~shed  stnce'J If I open and a m  forever 
rn the black adlaphane Basra! I will see tf I can see 
See now There  all the tlme wlthout you and ever shall be, world wtthout end 
(From Ulysses by James Joyce ) 
Joyce (or rather Dedalus) does not give an entirely correct description of what 
happens in experience when one closes one's eyes. The world may vanish as  
something I am seeing, but I continue to be aware of the presence of the world 
about me, of being among visible things. But the description by Joyce does 
capture something that I am continually aware of, however dimly: the world 
persists independently of me. 
All I need to do is to open my eyes and there are my study, the window, 
and, outside, the marsh stretching forth, intervening between me and the lake, 
the tops of sailboats gliding slowly above the trees. It is as though I am a 
window behind the window. Looking at what is there before me, I am almost 
passive, my body, my eyes, almost forgotten; for a moment it seemed as though 
I were no longer looking, seeing, feeling, but a self-less letting be. Often in 
visual experience the self fades into the background. Describing the scene one 
does not say "I saw . . ." but "There was . . .", unless, that is, one seeks some 
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personal recognition or distinction for a scene which was displayed to him so 
impersonally: "I saw the pheasants toward the shore; you won't find them 
here, now." 
This seems to be a faithful description of a most striking aspect of the 
ordinary experience of the world we find ourselves in. One is ordinarily ori- 
ented toward the things seen and not the seeing, toward the glimpsed and not 
toward the glimpse. We do  have experiences which remind us, however, that 
the scenes displayed before us are not untinged by ourselves. We dimly realize 
that we contribute meanings to the scene, endow it with visible structures and 
relations, transgress its limits in order to sharpen the significance of what is 
present. This is revealed to anyone who has tried to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of what he is seeing, who has tried to order what he sees, to 
regiment the world, to reach beyond the immediately visible in order to  grasp 
the universe. 
I t  can be seen that perceptual experience contains an element of assurance 
and acceptance which cannot be defined, an "awareness" of the independence 
and persistence of what is seen. One of our problems is to reach an under- 
standing of the element of acceptance or awareness through phenomenological 
description, by a more careful descriptive analysis of the contents of percep- 
tion. The acceptance with which we usually greet that which is before our eyes 
is not understood by explaining it away (as if one could explain it away without 
first understanding it as it lies in our perception "before us"). T o  reduce this 
assurance to habit o r  the effect of naively compounded beliefs is, in effect, to 
begin to talk about something else. If we reconstrued that acceptance or assur- 
ance as a bias in our neurons and, so to speak, lived that reconstrual, the world 
about us would become a pha~ztom world. Likewise, we fail to understand this 
element of assurance with all of its attendant characteristics, if, in a Cartesian 
vein, we seek grounds external to it, grounds which nevertheless purportedly 
give us that acceptance, and the world, back again. 
Thus our perceptual experience is seen by the most superficial glance to  
contain an awareness of the independence and persistence of what is seen. An 
aspect of this can be described as "the irresistible being-there of the visible." 
(N.B.: The use of 'irresistibility' here and henceforth is intended to suggest 
"independence of my will"-the object has the character of being something 
I cannot will away or will to be otherwise.) Let me explore this by more careful 
descript~on and reconstruction. 
Reviewing examples of past experience, one finds that an awareness of the 
irresistible being-there of a visible thing is sometimes modified by doubts about 
and even rejection of the existence of the "thing." This is the case when I later 
discover that what I thought I saw simply was not what was in my line of sight. 
This suggests that one must speak of the "irresistible being-there of the visible" 
only relative to momentary visual acts. In what sense is it correct, then, to 
speak of "irresistibility" (of independence of my will)? That tree stands there 
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before me so plainly that if I arbitrarily denied it solely in the context of this 
momentary visual field, then I could deny everything within the perceptual 
field. T o  deny the "being-there" of the tree and to live through that denial 
would be to "explode" the world and "explode" myself, for I am equally 
plainly a part of the world. If I a m  to be open to a world, if I myself am not 
to evaporate into a wisp of metaphysical vapor, then I must respect the 
apparent cogency of my perceptions, however fleeting and corruptible that 
cogency might appear in the long view. "The irresistible being-there of that 
which is visible" is a content that visual experiences have. Any arguments 
universally denying such experiences this content demonstrate against them- 
selves by their very denial. Such arguments show that either visual experience 
is not the concern of the arguments (despite the pretension to be making an 
argument about visual experience) or, at best, they reveal an incommensurabil- 
ity between the world of experience and the model or interpretation of the 
world of experience on which the arguments are based. 
A clear phenomenological task is to describe, to understand, this irresistibil- 
ity (this independence of will), to see clearly under what conditions it is to be 
found, to map the range of its necessary tnfluence in the course of experience 
of the world, and to pinpoint where its modifications can originate. In this 
respect we should expect an understanding of what there is about the structure 
of perceptual experience that allows us freedom to construe the world, t o  
regiment ~ t ,  and to contribute meanings to it-and to understand the respects 
in which the structure of experience limits this freedom. 
As I have been tacitly suggesting, one must distinguish between the content 
of a perceptual act and the epistemologicalevaluation ofthat  act. Epistemolog- 
ical evaluation introduces a concept of an entity and then seeks to determine 
the cognitive worth of, say, visual perception as a foundation of knowledge of 
that entity. At least for a while, a visual act presents us with objects having 
the character of being there independently of our thoughts and perceptions of 
them (the objects have, as I have said, the character of being-there irresistibly). 
One can say that such a content is always misleading otzly if one has introduced 
a notion of an entity which is such that visual perception may always be 
construed as being misleading about such entities. This does not compromise 
the content of the visual perception, but rather utilizes it to secure whatever 
information about those entities one can get-however misleading. T o  return 
to the problem of the last paragraph, the way to understand the content of our 
visual perceptions and the limitations of that content is to introduce a multi- 
tude of concepts of entities and to determine how the contents of visual 
perceptions may be utilized in building up knowledge of those entities. 
In his work on the phiIosophy of percept ion,Vrmstrong proceeds by 
introducing a series of concepts of objects (of immediately perceived objects 
and of mediately perceived objects, of phenomenal objects, of physical exis- 
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tents, and so on) and then seeks to determine whe.ther or not perception can 
be construed as yielding perceptions of those objects. He does produce a kind 
of phenomenology to decide these matters; he presents (sometimes through 
extended arguments) what he claims are traits of visual perception, and then 
evaluates perception so understood in terms of those concepts of entit~es. What 
is important from a phenomenological point of view is this: vlsual perceptions 
are in a sense originary; they present us with objects. We must look to the 
perceptions to "see" what we have as given in the visual act. The contents of 
the phenomena must be fully understood before we can rightly introduce and 
hope fully to justify any concept as an adequate concept of the sort of object 
we visually perceive. The contents of the perceptions, because of their funda- 
mental or originary character, strongly regulate how we may utilize our per- 
ceptions and what kind of theories we may introduce as explanatory 
elaborations of the objects we perceive. 
Ler us further examine the structure of visual acts. 
I find procIaimed as present before me in a field of vision not onIy the things 
scattered before me, but the being-there, the being-around-me, of the world. 
Just as irresistible as the being-there of the visible things is the being-there in 
the world. The things scattered about me  have the character of being things 
in the world. I cannot think of them without some reference to the world. I 
find that every visual act is not only a seeing of things, but a glimpse of the 
world as well, for an invariant character of a visual act's having the character 
of being a seeing of something is that it is also a glimpse of the world. 
Further inspection shows that the world as manifested in visual experience 
always has the character of being "the world." As I walk around the trees and 
the scene changes, the old and the new visual fields are related to one another 
as being glimpses of "the same world." The function of this aspect of vlsual 
acts, namely, that they are glimpses of "the world," is to unite the different 
scenes and to give them continuity. Our freedom to construe, to regiment, to 
order the world, seems to originate in this character of being glimpses of the 
same world which unites our visual experiences, for "the world" is greatly 
underdetermined with respect to visual perception. Of course it is not this 
character alone which unites our visual experiences. We often see that this 
scene is another one viewed from a different perspective, or that this is how 
things look on the other side of the woods. It seems that our understanding 
of different scenes as being glimpses of the "same world" is simply a reflection 
of relations between scenes that we can keep track of or see as we move about. 
But this is not quite the case, for, transported while asIeep to a strange place, 
our first reaction upon opening our eyes is likely to be, "Where in the world 
am I?" That is, our sense of ourselves as being in the world does not always 
originate in our making spatial connections between where we are now and 
where we have been. 
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Let us now review the invariant features of perceptual experience thus far 
isolated-although I do not claim that I am absolutely certain that these are 
invariant features of perceptual experience. I do  claim that they are tempo- 
rarily good approximations of such features, subject to considerable refinement 
and modification. 
Here are two such proposed invariant features of visual perceptual experi- 
ence: 
(I*) Every visual perceptual experience involves a presentation of some- 
thing which has the character of being there irresistibly, relative, at 
least, to the momentary perceptual act. 
(11*) Every visual perceptual act has the character of being not only a pet- 
ception of things, but of being a perception of "the world" as well. 
The trait (11*) serves to unite different perceptual acts. Although the relation 
of perceptual acts can sometimes be seen (e.g., "I see that this is just the other 
side of the tree I was looking a t  a moment ago"), these features can not be 
entirely reduced to the observation of such relations, as I have noted above. 
Let us now continue examining the contents of visual experiences, investi- 
gating their structure with greater attention to detail. (I*) and (11*) will guide 
us in our further studies. 
I am looking at a rabbit; it has the character of being there irresistibly (i.e., 
independent of me or any other experiencing and thinking subject). Despite 
the fact that parts and features of the rabbit are hidden from view, there is 
something clearly correct and compelling about my claim "I see a rabbit." It 
would be not only strange, but faithless to the content of my visual act, ~f I 
never indulged in such direct idiom, but always said only thrngs like "I see a 
rabbit-like surface and shape." The indirect idiom implies a shallowness of 
experience, as though one were seeing the world through a fog or smoked glass. 
But the rabbit, and not simply its shape and surface, is there in my field of 
vision (such is the irresistible content of my experience). The oblique idiom, 
while not involving one in falsehoods, is nevertheless misleading about the 
sense of the contents of our visual perceptions-what we see are not simply 
surfaces, but surfaces of things. 
These remarks suggest that the proper description of any momentary field 
of vision will not be a description of surfaces and shapes, but of an  area laid 
out in the world, a vaguely bordered area within which is typically found an 
array of things. I look toward the marsh and the lake. My field of vision is 
bounded by myself, the distant horizon, the sky, the marsh, and the lake. It 
includes all of the things in that area. Does this description include too much? 
Indeed, in what sense can I claim that all of the small things out there which 
are hidden from view are in my field of vision? I had observed that it was 
correct for me to say "I see the rabbit" even though some parts of the rabbit 
were hidden from view. I must likewise say that the marsh is visible, and the 
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marsh includes insects and plant life which are not visible but which are there 
just as surely as the tree has parts which are hidden from me. 
I want to say that the rabbit, the tree, the marsh, are visible, that I truly 
see them, that I see them but much of them is hidden from view. It is clear 
that in any act of seeing we must distinguish the things which have the 
character of being there from those aspects or parts of the things which are 
not hidden from view. The things which are in my fields of vision I shall place 
under the rubric 'what is present.' What is not hidden from view I will place 
under the rubric 'what is given.' The problem raised in the last paragraph is 
now solved by dividing the elements of my visual field into those which are 
given and those which are present. We now have the problem of investigating 
this distinction (which is imposed upon us by the character or sense of the 
content of visual experience as viewed from our phenomenological stand- 
point). 
I will now explore the distinction between the present and the given in order 
to strengthen it. Consider table 1 and figure 1, which present, respectively, 
examples of the dynamics of the distinction. 
TABLE I 
PRESENT GIVEN 
world 
marsh 
tree 
bark 
lake 
marsh 
sky 
trees 
grasses 
bushes 
b ~ r d s  
leaves 
limbs 
bark 
fungi 
moss 
color 
texture 
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world 
Under 'Givens' I have listed things not themselves given in their entirety. 
Each of the objects mentioned under 'Givens' can then be placed under 'Pres- 
ences,' for they are present and not entirely given. The objects under 'Pres- 
ences' have certain aspects which are in turn given. Consequently, these given 
aspects can be listed under 'Givens.' This procedure can be reiterated when 
I transfer something given to  the left-hand side of the table; the things present 
next time around become more superficial, shallower. This process of transfer 
is represented in figure 1. Think of figure 1 as an upside-down tree. A s  we reach 
the outermost branches, the objects increasingly approximate the surfaces of 
the field of vision. We might, therefore, try to define "pure givens" (= some- 
thing like Peirceian "Firsts," or, perhaps, Husserl's hyle) as a kind of mathe- 
mat~cal  imit of this branching tree. Some types of empirical philosophy might 
hold that such a limit exists. Some sort of imagined limit-process such as this 
is perhaps what those empiricists who tried to resolve the passing show into 
a parade of "sense data" had in mind. Let us consider what hinders isolating 
the "pure givens." As we move to the outer branches of the tree, our language 
becomes more refractory; increasingly delicate invention is called for. Inevita- 
bly, the delicacy of givens must outstrip the power of language-a problem 
arises concerning an effective definition of the actual limit. More directly, the 
further out we go the more we lose the capacity to observe and distinguish 
certain features on the surface of the things, features whose presence we are 
nevertheless aware of. I have in mind slight differences in colors and texture, 
of shapes and the like. But these reasons for the non-existence of "pure givens" 
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aside, we must contend with the following observation: we can never find a 
given which is free of an element of "presence," at least not in perceptual 
experience. The  bark is always the bark of the tree, color the color of the bark, 
and so on. 
These considerations lead to the following point, which seems to be a faithful 
account of the invariant structure of the (sense of the) givens of our visual field 
-all that is given is inseparable from the objects which are present in that field 
(where do you apply the scalpel?). There is no ground of separation, no outer 
limit of that fieId which might be called the "pure givens." Precisely because 
the givens always have the character of being an inseparable part of some 
presence transcending givens, we find ourselves in, we are aware of being in, 
and we are aware that the things scattered about us are in a world, "the world. " 
The qualitative contrast between the given and the present which pervades our 
visual act is an essential component of the irresistible being-there of the visible, 
i.e., the sense of a presence outstripping the givens is one of the roots o r  origins 
of that "irresistible being there." Without givenness there could be no mani- 
festation of presence* Without presence, givenness would be a t  best something 
ephemeral, fleeting and superficial, as well as mind-dependent in some sense 
favorable to  strong idealism. Without the element of presence, the experienced 
world (if there could be such a thing for us without the element) would have 
the character of being a phantom world, an undulating and continually chang- 
ing subjective flux. 
Without the tension between the given and the present, our visual field 
would collapse, we would no longer be aware of ourselves as being given a 
glimpse of things in a world. This suggests that there is a reason for our not 
being able to make between "given" and "present" an exact distinction in the 
context of visual experience. The successful sharp distinction of what is given 
from what is present would destroy the urgency or irresistibility of the presence 
of something more than is "given." 
(I*) and (11*) above-the purported invariant features of visual acts-can 
now be modified as follows. Every visual act involves: 
(I) something which has the character of being present, 
(11) something given which has the character of being an aspect of what 
is present, and 
(111) the being-present of "the world." 
By way of achieving further illumination of the relations among (I), (11), and 
(111), consider a series of visual acts. As we have seen by an inspection of 
arbitrarily selected visual acts, each is a glimpse of the world. Indeed, the 
invariant content of visual experiences is that they are a glimpse of "the 
mylar tape which can be fficiently far apart in time and sufficiently different 
in content it is a difficult problem, if not always an unsolvable problem, to see 
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clearly how the contents of the visual acts are related to one another as being 
parts of "the world." This suggests that the invariant content of the visual acts 
described under (111) above is not derived from our  actually seeing or  observ- 
ing a relation among things in visual fields sufficiently distinct that the relation 
shows that they are parts of the same world. The  sense of the experience to 
the effect that they are different parts of the same world must therefore have 
originated in an awareness of some other kind than the awareness of the things 
and the places which are actually seen. 
Figure 1 suggests that "the world" as it is present in experience is of a 
different order from other entities which are present. I t  does not function as 
the given features or  parts of any other transcendent presence. The world is 
never brought into a visual fieId. I t  is rather the point of convergence of all 
branches as we move back up the tree of givens to presences. It is possible to 
continue indefinitely this backward process along branches toward a point of 
covergence (viz., "the world") without ever arriving there. 
I certainly have no more than touched the surface of these matters, but 
enough has been said to make some general comments about the significance 
(or potential significance) of these observations for understanding conditions 
on theory formations in in the natural sciences. 
As we look at the sun at various times during the day, what is given is the 
shifting of the position of the sun, seemingly tracing an arc across the sky. But 
we know that what is present in the manifestation of change of position is not 
the movement of the sun but the rotation of our planet. The awareness of what 
is present (where the awareness of something being present is essential for us 
to experience the world visually) is altered through thought and further experi- 
ence. Consider another example. This old oaken desk is present to me. How- 
ever, we have ''learned" that while the wooden desk is given, a bundle of 
molecules is present. Because they are so present, they are also in some sense 
given. The important problem is to trace phenomenologicalIy the path or  paths 
through experience to such modifications of the original naive sense of what 
is present. This would not be a historical study, but a phenomenological study 
of the possible paths through experience and the nature of those paths which 
are such that if they are actualized, then a transformation of the kind that 
interests us would be achieved. The point is that in order to solve the natural- 
scientific problem of what is truly present, as one travels along this path with 
its modifications and extensions of the content of past experiences, some 
element of presence, especially the presence of "the world" must be preserved. 
It cannot be preserved by mere hypothetical positing. Rather, there must be 
a continued element of genuine presence, an irresistible being-there in the 
external fieId of experience. Without this sense of continuity there would be 
gaps which would leave us at  a loss to say in what sense the final theory (Earth 
rotates, matter is molecular) describes "the world." Arbitrary or  speculative 
elements would intrude. This is precisely a theme of Husserl's Crisis of the 
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European Sciences; most especially, Husserl's (and Langrebe's) Erfahrung und 
Urteil develops the groundwork of a "logic" for the development of scientific 
theory which systematically takes into account and preserves the element of 
presence (qua levels of "judgment") as one proceeds in one's cognitive inqui- 
ries. 
The "worId" presented in visual perception is, in part, what Husserl spoke 
of as "the lived-world." It is the starting point of natural science, the constant 
and continued element of "presence" which must be preserved. Husserl speaks 
of the "lived-world" as "the forgotten meaning-fundament of the natural 
sciences" and as the limits or "horizon of all meaningful induction," as limits 
on the utilization of perception (see above for the sense of using the word 
'utilization') in the achievement of "knowledge." 
We have seen how "the world" is presented in perception with the concrete 
object of perception, We have also seen how it is a peculiarity of the presenta- 
tion of the world that its presentation is a condition on recognizing an experi- 
ence as a perception of something, and that its presentation does not seem to 
be bound up with previous perceptions-one does not have to trace a connec- 
tion between contents to be assured that one is seeing "the world." This trait 
of perception is not derived on the basis of an epistemological evaluation of 
perception, but rather is fundamental to the contents of perception. This 
suggests that what we may rationally (compellingly and insightfully) count as 
an experience of "the world" is not bound by an essence, but that the element 
of "presence" which we count as the presence of the world in our perceptions 
may be pursued along different paths with quite different theories resulting, 
and yet those theories could all have the character of being theories-good 
theories-of "the world." That is, we must be very careful not to treat "the 
world" as a thing writ large. "Nature" is something quite different from any 
object we might find in nature. It is essentially fuzzy (or underdetermined) so 
that it can be essentially there in our ordinary perceptions and in our theory- 
laden and modified perceptions resulting from theoretical penetration to 
deeper "presences," from a shifting and deepening array of perceptual givens, 
as chairs give way to molecules and as molecules give way to high-energy 
mysteries. 
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